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We infer the employment response to a minimum wage change by
calibrating a model of employment for the restaurant industry. Whereas
perfect competition implies that employment falls and prices rise after
a minimum wage increase, the monopsony model potentially implies
the opposite. We show that estimated price responses are consistent
with the competitive model. We place fairly tight bounds on the em-
ployment response, with the most plausible parameter values sug-
gesting that a 10% increase in the minimum wage lowers low-skill
employment by 2%–4% and total restaurant employment by 1%–3%.
I. Introduction
Until the early 1990s, the consensus was that an increase in the mini-
mum wage causes a small but statistically and economically significant
loss in employment (e.g., Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982). While it was
known that this need not be the case if firms have wage-setting power
(Stigler 1946), the empirical results confirmed the qualitative predictions
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of standard models of perfect competition, which most researchers sus-
pected were relevant for industries that primarily employed minimum
wage workers.
However, Card and Krueger’s work in the early 1990s spawned a con-
tentious debate over the magnitude, and perhaps even the sign, of the
employment response. In a series of papers, they found no—or, in some
cases, a small positive—employment response to an increase in the min-
imum wage.1 Moreover, they discuss a number of other facts that may
be inconsistent with competitive markets but consistent with monopsony
power, including a spike in the distribution of wages at the minimum and
the prevalence of posted vacancies. Recent theoretical developments have
been able to generate monopsony-like employment responses after min-
imum wage increases by introducing labor market search with frictions
(Burdett and Mortensen 1998), efficiency wages (Manning 1995; Rebitzer
and Taylor 1995), or monopsonistic competition with free entry (Bhaskar
and To 1999).
This work has not gone unchallenged, as exemplified by the discussions
in Card and Krueger (2000) and Neumark and Wascher (2000). The latter
authors, again in a series of papers (e.g., see Neumark and Wascher [1996]
for a review), consistently find an effect more in line with the Brown et
al. (1982) literature review; a 10% increase in the minimum wage leads
to roughly a 2% decrease in teen employment.2 Others, including Deere,
Murphy, and Welch (1995), Kim and Taylor (1995), and Burkhauser,
Couch, and Wittenburg (2000), find even larger negative effects, on the
order of 2%–6%. This confusion is particularly acute since the majority
of these papers use the same sources of variation to identify the employ-
ment elasticity (albeit often from different time periods or geographic
areas), either the cross-sectional or time-series comovement of teenage
employment and the minimum wage.
While many of these papers claim to be testing the market structure
of low-wage labor markets, none consider explicitly what the competitive
and monopsonistic models they use imply. In this article, we make such
a demonstration. Using data from the restaurant industry, we calibrate a
model of employment determination to infer employment and price re-
1 See Card and Krueger (1995) for a review. A sampling of other papers that
corroborate these findings includes Wellington (1991), Machin and Manning (1996,
1997), and Dickens, Machin, and Manning (1999). See Neumark and Wascher
(2003) for a long list of international studies, many of which find no employment
response.
2 These results are consistent with views reported in a survey of leading labor
economists (Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba 1998). However, a full quarter of re-
spondents believe that there is no teenage disemployment effect from a 10%
increase in the minimum wage, and another quarter judge the response to be 3%
or higher.
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.139 on August 11, 2016 07:28:07 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage 169
sponses to a change in the minimum wage implied by the two market
structures.
We initially calculate the responses assuming that restaurants are price
takers in both the factor and product markets.3 Several pieces of infor-
mation are supplied to the model, including factor costs, the intensity of
usage of low-wage workers, the elasticity of substitution between factors,
the elasticity of labor supply, and the elasticity of product demand. The
model predicts that a 10% increase in the minimum wage reduces low-
skill restaurant industry employment by roughly 2.5%–4% and total
restaurant employment by 1.5%–3% under perfect competition. A second
implication of perfect competition is that higher labor costs are pushed
onto consumers in the form of higher prices.
Next, we augment the model so employers potentially have monopsony
power in the labor market. Under monopsony, employment potentially
rises in response to an increase in the minimum wage. An implication is
that when employment rises, output also rises, and thus output prices
fall. Therefore, the competitive and monopsonistic models have different
employment and output price predictions.
We use the model’s output price implications to test for the potential
importance of monopsony behavior in the labor market. This test relies
on research (e.g., Aaronson 2001; Aaronson, French, and MacDonald
2005) that shows that most of the higher labor costs incurred by employers
are pushed onto consumers in the form of higher prices, a finding that
is in sharp contrast to the prediction of monopsony models. Conse-
quently, we infer that few restaurants will increase employment in re-
sponse to a minimum wage increase. Using the most plausible range of
estimates of the model’s key parameters, we find that the employment
response to a 10% change in the minimum wage is likely between 2%
and 4% for low-skill workers and between 1% and 3% for total restaurant
employment. We argue that the estimates are well within the bounds set
in the empirical literature. All of these predictions are robust to allowing
for monopolistic competition in the product market.
It is important to emphasize that our estimates are for the restaurant
industry only. Nevertheless, this industry is a major employer of low-
wage labor and therefore a particularly relevant one to study.4 However,
3 We assume that the minimum wage affects wages and the price of the output
good but does not affect the prices of other factor inputs.
4 Prominent examples of studies that concentrate on the restaurant industry
include Katz and Krueger (1992), Card and Krueger (1995, 2000), and Neumark
and Wascher (2000). According to the Current Population Survey’s Outgoing
Rotation Groups, eating and drinking places (SIC 641) is the largest employer of
workers at or near the minimum wage, accounting for roughly a fifth of such
employees in 1994 and 1995. The next-largest employer, retail grocery stores,
employs less than 7% of minimum-wage or near-minimum-wage workers. More-
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as a result of different intensities of use of minimum-wage labor, substi-
tution possibilities, market structure, or demand for their products, other
industries might face different employment responses.
Section II describes the basic framework of our study. In that section,
we introduce the competitive and monopsony models and show how to
use price pass-through to infer the extent of monopsony power. Many
of the results from the section are discussed further in a longer version
of this article, Aaronson and French (2006). Section III and the appendix
at the end of this article discuss the main parameters used to calibrate the
model and the results. Finally, Section IV offers some concluding com-
ments.
II. The Model
This section outlines the structure of the model and the assumptions
used to identify the employment response to a minimum wage change.
We begin with the perfect competition case and then introduce monop-
sony power, offering some intuition for the ambiguous impact the latter
has on employment. Finally, we provide a framework for bounding the
importance of monopsony power in the labor market, using primarily
the output price response to minimum wage changes.
A. Model Setup
Throughout this article, we assume that a large number,5 of firmsN,
with identical production technologies and identical products are perfectly
competitive in the product market, sell their products at a price, andp,
choose their inputs to maximize profits, :p
p(K, L, H, M)p pQ rKw Lw H p M, (1)L H M
where is a constant elasticity of substitution aggre-Qp F(K, L, H, M)
gator of low-skill labor, , high-skill labor, H, capital, and materials,L K,
purchased at prices 6 and respectively:M, r, w , w , p ,L H M
r r r r 1/rQp (a K  a L  a H  (1 a  a  a )M ) , (2)K L H K L H
where is the partial elasticity of substitution betweenj{ 1/(1 r) K,
over, the intensity of use of minimum-wage workers in the eating and drinking
industry is among the highest of the industrial sectors.
5 We do not allow for exit or entry, although we allow the size of businesses
to change in response to wage changes.
6 We assume that the minimum wage covers all employers in the labor market.
However, employees in restaurants with revenues of less than $500,000 per year
are not covered by federal minimum wage law.
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, and M in the production of 7 The assumption of constantL , L Q.L H
elasticities of substitution between all factors is roughly consistent with
the empirical literature described in Hamermesh (1993). The market price
is
N
1/h
pp Z Q , (3)( )n
np1
where is market output and h is the elasticity of demand for theN Qnnp1
output good. Although the case we consider here is competition in the
product market, augmenting the model for monopolistic competition in
the product market complicates the analysis but does not change the
results.8
B. Long-Run Price and Employment Responses of Competitive Firms
Assume that all low-skill workers are paid the minimum wage but that
high-skill workers are paid above it (Sec. II.E relaxes the assumption that
all low-skill workers are paid the minimum wage). Also assume that the
minimum wage only affects the wage of low-skill workers and that the
supplies of all factors of production to the firm are perfectly elastic.
Assuming that all firms can adjust all factors, the price and employment
responses to a minimum wage hike, derived in the appendix of Aaronson
and French (2006), have simple analytical solutions. When firms are per-
fectly competitive (or monopolistically competitive, as in the appendix of
Aaronson and French [2006]) and have a constant returns production
function, economic profits must be zero both before and after the wage
change. Consequently, all changes in labor costs are passed onto the con-
sumer, that is,
d ln p
p s , (4)Ld ln wmin
where is low-skill labor’s share ofs { w L/(w Lw H rK p M)L L L H M
total costs.9
Because prices are higher after the minimum wage hike, the quantity
produced declines by % for every 1% increase in the minimum wage.s hL
7 The constant returns production function assumption implies that the size of
each firm is indeterminate. However, assuming infinitesimally decreasing returns
to scale and an infinitesimally small fixed cost of running the firm preserves all
the results yet implicitly defines a firm’s size. Therefore, we consider the firm
size problem unimportant.
8 So long as firms face constant elasticity of demand, all of the remaining equa-
tions in this article are unaffected. See the appendix in Aaronson and French
(2006).
9 Under perfect competition, with no profits, is also equal to low-skill labor’ssL
share of revenue, s pw L/pQ.L L
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The elasticity of demand for low-skill labor, , isl{ d ln L/d ln wmin
d ln p d ln p
lp  1 j h. (5)( ) ( )( )d ln w d ln wmin min
Here l is rising (in absolute value) in the elasticity of substitution between
labor and the other factors of production (the “substitution effect”) and
the elasticity of demand for the output good (the “scale effect”).10 The
substitution effect measures the change in factor ratios given a wage
change, holding output fixed. The scale effect measures the change in
output given a wage change, holding factor ratios fixed. Inserting equation
(4) into equation (5) yields equation ( ) in Hamermesh (1993) and′2.7a
equation (11.6) in Card and Krueger (1995).
Nevertheless, there are several reasons why one might be wary of the
long-run competitive employment response shown in equation (5). It is
to two of these concerns that we turn next. In Section II.C, we discuss
the short-run employment response when firms cannot adjust their capital
stock in response to a minimum wage change. Section II.D introduces
monopsony power in the labor market.
C. Short-Run Price and Employment Responses of Competitive Firms
In the short run, firms might not be able to adjust their capital stock
in response to a minimum wage change, perhaps because of high adjust-
ment costs or the irreversibility of these investments.11 In order to capture
the concept of fixed capital, we assume that firms choose capital in order
10 Although the empirical evidence suggests that all elasticities of substitution
between factors of production are roughly similar in magnitude, one could argue
that some substitution elasticities are close to zero whereas others (such as the
elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill labor) are large. How-
ever, note that both eqq. (4) and (5) can also be derived for the production function
r r 1/rQpmin {((1a )H a L ) ,a K,a M},L L K M
where is redefined as Therefore, by properly adjustings s {w L/(w Lw H).L L L L H
r and it is possible to get some measure of the robustness of our results tos ,L
different substitution elasticities between factors.
11 Empirical work on the disemployment effect of the minimum wage typically
focuses on annual changes to employment, comparing levels before and after the
new minimum wage. This short-run response likely abstracts from many ad-
justments to the capital-labor ratio that may arise over time in response to higher
wage bills. For example, in the fast food industry over the past decade or so, cash
registers have been modified so that the cashier need not know the price of a
product, only its appearance. These machines also save time by directly trans-
ferring orders from the cash register to the cooks. It is these long-run responses
that are likely of greater interest to policy makers. Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger
(1999) illustrate the potentially distinct employment effects that arise at different
time horizons.
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to maximize profits, keeping the wage of low-skill labor constant. But,
after the wage changes, the firm can adjust all factors except capital.12
In the appendix of Aaronson and French (2006), we show that, if capital
cannot adjust, the price response to a change in the minimum wage is
d ln p sL
p . (6)
d ln w s (h/j) (1 s )min K K
Inserting equation (6) into equation (5) gives the short-run employment
response.
An interesting special case arises when j, the partial elasticity of sub-
stitution between factor inputs, and h, the elasticity of demand for the
output good, are equal. In this situation, the price response is identical
whether capital is fixed (eq. [6]) or flexible (eq. [4]). Additional labor costs
are always and fully pushed onto consumers in the form of higher prices.
To see why, note that the elasticity of capital in response to changes in
the minimum wage when capital can adjust is
d ln K
p s (j h). (7)Ld ln wmin
Therefore, if we should expect no capital response to changes injp h,
the minimum wage, even if capital can adjust. Thus the fixity of capital
is irrelevant.
A second interesting case is when the production function is Leontief
(i.e., ). So long as the firm can cover its variable costs (i.e.,jp 0 pQ 1
), firms cannot increase profits by reducing output.w Lw H p KL H K
Therefore, prices and employment are unaffected by changes in the min-
imum wage. One notable application is putty-clay models (Johansen 1959;
Gilchrist and Williams 2000). Although most empirical studies find evi-
dence of positive substitutability between factors of production (Ham-
ermesh 1993), putty-clay models develop the idea that there may be sub-
stitutability between factors for firms being put into place but no
substitutability for firms already in place. Therefore, substitutability be-
tween factors only exists in the long run as new firms enter the market-
place. In the short run, putty-clay models also predict no employment
or price response to minimum wage hikes. Regardless, the key intuition,
formalized in equation (5), is that price and employment responses are
linked.
12 This approach can be justified by the following three-period model. In period
1, firms choose K and believe that they know period 2 prices with probability 1.
In period 2, all prices are revealed, and the wage potentially changes. The firm can
then pick L and M. Although K is set for period 2, the firm can pick period 3 values
of K. In period 3, all prices were as anticipated. In this case, period 2 represents the
short-run equilibrium, and period 3 represents the long-run equilibrium.
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Finally, part of the reduction in low-skill labor is potentially offset by
increases in high-skill labor. The employment response of high-skill labor
is
d ln H d ln p
p (j h). (8)( )
d ln w d ln wmin min
The first term shows the change in product price (which is also equal to
the change in marginal cost). The second term has offsetting substitution
and scale effects. After the minimum wage increases, high-skill labor be-
comes relatively cheaper than low-skill labor, causing firms to substitute
to the former. However, the level of output falls, causing the firm to
reduce all factors. If , this offset is exact and we should expect nojp h
high-skill labor response to changes in the minimum wage.
D. The Short-Run Employment and Price Responses of
Monopsonistic Firms
Next, we derive the employment and price effects of minimum wage
changes when firms are monopsonists in the labor market, or more spe-
cifically, monopsonistically competitive, as in Dickens et al. (1999) or
Manning (2003). The contribution of this model relative to others is that
we endogenize prices. The production function and product market are
the same as in the previous section. We show that employment may rise
in response to a minimum wage hike but that this implies that prices will
fall.
Many researchers have argued that fast food restaurants are highly
competitive and that therefore monopsony power is likely to be negli-
gible.13 However, models such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998) where
employee search is costly often imply that employers have some degree
of monopsony power. Furthermore, Card and Krueger (1995) document
several empirical facts that may be inconsistent with competitive models
but that are consistent with monopsony models. For example, they argue
that a well-documented spike in the wage distribution at the minimum
implies that, unless there is a similarly sized and placed spike in the
distribution of ability, some workers are not paid their marginal revenue
product of labor. We show below that the presence of a spike in the
minimum wages is not necessarily evidence of monopsony power. But
other facts, such as the existence of posted vacancies, are not consistent
with competition if it is costly to post a vacancy. Competitive theory
implies that an employer can obtain an unlimited number of workers at
13 Although Stigler (1946) was the first to observe the potential importance of
monopsony power when analyzing minimum wage policy, he was clearly suspicious
that this was a relevant scenario.
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the going wage rate and that any vacancy is immediately filled. Therefore,
it seems plausible that restaurants have some amount of market power.
In this model, all low-skill workers are identical in their productivity,
but because of differences in local labor market conditions, all firms in
some markets pay above the minimum wage and all firms in other markets
pay the minimum wage.14 Each of the N firms within a given local labor
market face the labor supply curve for low-skill labor,15
g g g g1 1 2 1L p v w w , (9)n L,n L,n
where is the wage offered by the nth firm and is the averagew wL,n L,n
wage offered by all other firms in the market. Therefore, all N firms
compete in the same product and labor market.16 We assume that g ≥1
so that the quantity of labor supplied to the firm is increasing in theg ,2
wage offered by the firm and weakly falling in the wage offered by other
firms in the market. We also assume that : if all firms in the marketg ≥ 02
increase their wage, the total quantity of labor supplied in the market will
increase. We assume that v potentially varies by labor market, although
we do not give v a subscript for notational convenience. Therefore, within
each local labor market, all firms face the same wage and output price,
but the (low-skill) wage and output price varies across labor markets.
Using equation (9), the inverse labor supply curve for low-skill labor
is
1/g 1(g /g )1 2 1w(L )p vL w , (10)n n L,n
and their offered wage is
w p max {w(L), w }. (11)L min
Note that in equilibrium all firms within a given market will purchase
the same amount of factor inputs and will have the same level of output.
Therefore, we drop the n subscripts for notational convenience.
Figure 1 shows the competitive and monopsony solutions to the firm’s
problem. The competitive solution (if the firm is a price taker in the labor
market with an exogenous wage ) is for the firm to hire workersw** L**
at a wage However, if the firm has monopsony power, the firm willw**.
pay only and will hire workers.w* L*
14 We assume that the wage ratio between high-skill and low-skill workers is
constant across labor markets. See Sec. II.F for more details.
15 Manning (2003) derives an identical specification starting from a specification
analogous to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
16 Thus we allow for differences in wages and the importance of monopsony
power across labor markets, although we assume that all employers of low-skill
labor are identical within a labor market. This is an extreme assumption given that
only 25% of all minimum-wage workers are employed in the restaurant industry
and thus restaurants compete with many types of firms in the labor market.
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Fig. 1.—Illustration of monopsony equilibrium
Whether employment rises, falls, or remains constant in response to an
increase in the minimum wage is determined by the level of the minimum
wage. The simplest case occurs when the minimum wage is not binding
In this case, a small change in the minimum wage has no(w ! w*).min
effect on employment. Equilibrium employment and wages are andL*
, respectively.w*
Now, suppose that the minimum wage is set between and . Inw* w**
this case, employment in a labor market with a minimum wage (e.g.,
in fig. 2) is greater than employment in the absence of the minimumLmin
wage 17 The intuition for this result is that, although the minimum(L*).
wage increases the average cost of labor for the firm, it reduces the mar-
ginal cost of labor from to . Below the marginal(1 (1/g ))w* w L ,1 min min
cost of labor, is the minimum wage. Whether the firm hires orLmin
workers, all workers are paid However, for employmentL  1 w .min min
levels above the marginal cost of labor is above the minimum wage;L ,min
17 Note that a change in the minimum wage changes both the labor supply curve
faced by the firm (because changes) and the MRP(L) curve faced by the firmwL,n
(because the output price charged by other firms changes). Thus the figures are not
helpful for understanding the quantitative price and employment responses, al-
though they are helpful for understanding the qualitative responses. Furthermore,
because the labor supply curve and MRP(L) curve shift in response to the minimum
wage, changing the minimum wage also changes the boundary conditions andw*
. Below, when we refer to we mean the value of it for which ,w** w*, w*pwmin
and is the value for which . Therefore, fig. 2 is not technicallyw** w**pwmin
correct, although it helps clarify the intuition of the model.
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Fig. 2.—Illustration of monopsony equilibrium with minimum wage (bold line denotes
MC(L) curve).ln
no additional workers will work for The employer must increasew .min
the pay of all workers in order to obtain an additional one. Consequently,
employment is determined by the intersection of the minimum wage and
the inverse labor supply function Therefore, increases in the min-w(L).
imum wage lead to increases in employment for Spe-w  [w*, w**).min
cifically, the percent change in employment in the market (and thus the
percent change in employment for every firm in the market) is
d ln L
p g . (12)2Fd ln wmin w pw pwL,n L,n min
The important insight is that, although is the relevant parameter forg1
understanding the gap between the wage and the marginal revenue product
of labor,18 it is that is important for understanding the employmentg2
response to the minimum wage.
We now solve out for the price response under monopsony when
In the appendix to Aaronson and French (2006), wew  [w*, w**).min
show that given equation (12) but allowing for prices and other factors
18 In the absence of a minimum wage, the marginal revenue product of labor is
times the wage, and for this reason is sometimes known as the rate(1 (1/g )) 1/g1 1
of exploitation.
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of production to adjust in the same way we did when allowing for a
competitive labor market yields
d ln p
pFd ln w w pw pwmin L,n L,n min
[s g (1 (1/g(v))]/ j(1 s ) s h if capital can adjust,( )L 2 L L{[s g (1 (1/g(v))]/ j(1 s  s ) (s  s )h if capital cannot adjust( )L 2 L K L K
(13)
for some where1/g(v)  [0, (1/g )],1
(ln L**ln L)/(ln L**ln L*)
1 1
p 1  1( )g(v) g1
measures the difference between the wage and the marginal revenue prod-
uct of labor, the vertical distance between and MRP(L) in figureln w(L) ln
1.
Finally, if the minimum wage lies above the point of intersection of the
inverse labor supply function and the marginal revenue product of labor
function MRP(L), that is, employment falls as the minimumw 1 w(L**),min
wage rises. The marginal cost of labor function, MC(L), is always equal
to the minimum wage. The firm then sets employment by equating the
MRP(L) curve and the minimum wage, as in Sections II.B and II.C.
Because the MRP(L) curve slopes down, increases in the minimum wage
unambiguously lead to a reduction in employment. The magnitude of the
disemployment effect was discussed in Section II.B for the case where
capital can adjust and in II.C for the case where capital cannot adjust.
Note that the price response in equation (13) is unambiguously negative.
Also recall that equations (4) and (6) showed that, under competition (or
if ), wage hikes unambiguously increase prices. Therefore, inw 1 w**min
response to a minimum wage hike, employment and price changes are
always negatively related.19 Employment falls and prices rise under perfect
competition, and employment can rise and prices can fall under monop-
sony. Consequently, price data offer an alternative means of inferring the
importance of monopsony power in the labor market.
E. Using Price Pass-Through to Infer the Extent of Monopsony Power
This section proposes a method to infer the extent to which monop-
sonistic behavior is important, using empirical estimates of price pass-
through, Furthermore, we show that once we infer theE[d ln p/d ln w ].min
19 Again, the substitutability of high-skill labor and low-skill labor can result in
an offsetting employment response of high-skill labor.
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.139 on August 11, 2016 07:28:07 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage 179
importance of monopsony behavior, we can infer the employment re-
sponse to increasing the minimum wage.
We allow for the fact that the minimum wage binds in some labor
markets but not in others because of variation in labor supply (i.e., v).
Given the results above, and assuming that capital cannot adjust, the price
response to a minimum wage change is
d ln p
(v)p
d ln wmin
s /[s (h/j) (1 s )] if w ≥ w**,L K K min
[s g (1 (1/g(v)]/ j(1 s  s ) (s  s )h if w* ≤ w ! w**,( )L 2 L K L K min{0 if w ! w*.min
(14)
Line 1 is derived in equation (6) and line 2 in equation (13). If the minimum
wage does not bind (line 3), output prices will not respond to a minimum
wage increase.
The employment response is
j(hj) s /[s (h/j) (1 s )]) if w ≥ w**,( L K K min
l(v)p g if w(L*) ≤ w ! w**,2 min{0 if w ! w*.min
(15)
Line 1 is derived using equation (5), plus the price response in line 1 of
equation (14). Line 2 is derived in equation (12). If the minimum wage
is not binding, as in line 3, there is no employment response.
Define as the share of firms that pay the minimum wagePr (w 1 w*)min
and as the share of firms facing a bindingVp Pr (w ≥ w**Fw 1 w*)min min
minimum wage such that the minimum wage is equal to the . IfMRP(L)
, then all firms affected by the minimum wage behave competitivelyVp 1
in the labor market. If , then all firms affected behave as monop-Vp 0
sonists. If we knew V, we could use equation (15) to compute the average
employment response. If all firms have the same elasticities and factor
shares, then
E[l]p l(v)dF(v)p Pr (w 1 w*) min
v
# V j (hj) s /[s (h/j) (1 s )]  1V g . (16)( [ ]) ( )( )L K K 2( )
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Fortunately, we can calculate V by using the extent of price pass-
through. Analogous to equation (16), the average price response is
d ln p d ln p
E p (v)dF(v)[ ]d ln w d ln wvmin min
(1V)g 1 (1/g(v))( )2V
p Pr (w 1 w*)s #  .min L ([ ] [ ])s (h/j) (1 s ) j(1 s  s ) (s  s )h( )K K L K L K
(17)
Rearranging equation (17), we can solve explicitly for V:
Vp
E[d ln p/d ln w ][1/ Pr (w 1 w*)] s g [1 (1/g(v))]/ j(1 s  s ) (s  s )h( )min min L 2 L K L K
.
[s /(s (h/j) (1 s ))] s g (1 (1/g(v))) / j(1 s  s ) (s  s )h[ ] ( )L K K L 2 L K L K
(18)
Values of , can be computed or takenE[d ln p/d ln w] s , g , g , h, and jK 1 2
from the existing literature. We report the values that we use in table 1
and in the appendix. However, we do not have direct estimates of
or . In Section II.F, we show how to infer these objectsPr (w 1 w*) smin L
using additional information.
In deriving equations (17) and (18), we assumed that and do nots sL K
vary across labor markets. However, the theory presented above indicates
that the factor mix (and thus and ) varies across labor markets. Ins sL K
the appendix, we provide empirical evidence, based on the 1997 Economic
Census for Accommodations and Food Services and the outgoing rotation
files of the Current Population Survey (CPS), that there is little geographic
variation in labor’s share. In the appendix to Aaronson and French (2006),
we also show that, given the calibrated values described in the appendix,
geographic differences in low-skill labor’s share are likely small, varying
by less than 15% (or 4 percentage points) across labor markets.20
We make two final observations about the model. First, all of the com-
petitive and monopsony predictions described in this section are robust
to allowing for monopolistic competition in the product market so long
as there is a constant elasticity of demand. This result is established in
the appendix of Aaronson and French (2006).
Second, this model generates a spike in the distribution of wages at the
20 Given the parameters listed in Sec. III, allowing for labor’s share to vary across
markets had only a modest effect on our results.
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minimum, even if monopsony power is nonexistent.21 This is the case so
long as j and h are finite (i.e., labor is not a perfect substitute for materials
or capital, and there is finite elasticity of demand for the output good).
Under these reasonable assumptions, low-skill labor will still be used as
a factor of production even when the price of labor rises, and increases
in output prices will lead to a reduction, but not to a cessation, in output.
In a geographically segmented labor market with heterogeneous but not
perfectly substitutable labor, raising the minimum wage slightly above
the competitive wage will not shut down the industry. Even if labor were
homogenous, increasing the minimum wage would not shut down an
industry. Therefore, higher labor costs caused by an increase in the min-
imum wage can be (partially) pushed onto consumers.
F. Aggregation Issues
Ideally, we would like to use parameters to calibrate the model that
correspond to restaurants that pay at or near the minimum wage. Un-
fortunately, we often must rely on estimates in the literature that come
from more aggregated sources, particularly the entire restaurant industry.
If all restaurants were identical, facing identical labor and product markets,
using aggregate data would not be a problem. But clearly this is not the
case.
Perhaps the most serious concern is that we do not know either the
fraction of restaurants that pay the minimum wage (i.e., Pr (w 1 w*))min
or low-wage labor’s share at restaurants that pay the minimum wage,
. However, we do have a good amount of related information, includingsL
the share of restaurant workers who are paid the minimum wage
( , labor’s share of total costs in the restaurant industryPr (w p w ))min i
( ), the fraction of workers who are low skill ( ) at any givens  s Pr (L)L H
restaurant (and are thus paid the minimum wage in low-wage markets),
the average number of workers per restaurant by high-wage ( ) andZmin
low-wage ( ) establishments, and minimum-wage labor’s share of theZmin
aggregate wage bill.
In order to recover and , we assume that there are onlyPr (w 1 w*) smin L
three types of labor markets (i.e., v can take on only three different values):
those that pay the minimum wage to workers and behave competitively
(i.e., markets where the minimum wage intersects the MRP(L) curve for
21 Within our model, all low-skill workers are paid the same wage, although there
is wage dispersion across labor markets. If two workers within the same labor
market had different wages before the minimum wage hike, they will have different
wages after the minimum wage hike. There is some empirical evidence against this
implication of the model. Card and Krueger (1995) show that, within states, min-
imum wage hikes significantly compress wages for those paid near the minimum
wage. Unless labor markets are smaller than states (which may be true for minimum-
wage workers), this is evidence against the model.
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every firm in the market), markets that behave monopsonistically (i.e.,
markets where the minimum wage intersects the labor supply curve for
every firm in the market), and markets where the minimum wage does
not bind. In markets where the minimum does not bind, all firms pay
their low-skill workers . Furthermore, high-wage workerswagediff#wmin
are paid a constant multiple of the wage of low-skill workers within the
market. Thus, there is a four-point wage distribution, with heterogeneity
in two dimensions: high-skill and low-skill workers and high-wage and
low-wage labor markets. We assume that is the same in high-wagePr (L)
and low-wage labor markets.22
In the appendix to Aaronson and French (2006), we show that
Pr (w ≥ w(L*))pmin
[Pr (w p w )/ Pr (L)]min i ,
1 [Pr (w p w )/ Pr (L)] [(Pr (w p w )/ Pr (L)]/(Z /Z )min i min i min min
(19)
where the right-hand side of equation (19) collapses to Pr (w p w )/min i
when . Using household data, we can measurePr (L) Z /Z p 1min min
fairly accurately.Pr (w p w )min i
Because we have information on but not for alone, we musts  s sL H L
infer the relative shares of each factor. In order to infer , we matchsL
minimum-wage labor’s share of the total wage bill (i.e., the share of total
wages going to minimum-wage labor) to the data. In the appendix to
Aaronson and French (2006), we show that low-skill labor’s share is
′s p s  s # minimum-wage labor s share of the total wage bill( ) ( )L L H
Pr (w ≥ w(L*)) (1Pr (w ≥ w(L*)))#wagediff# (Z /Z )min min min min
# .( )Pr (w ≥ w(L*))min
(20)
The right-hand side of equation (20) has three parts. The first part is
labor’s share. The product of the second and third parts are the share of
labor costs going to low-skill labor.
22 Assuming that wages for high-skill workers is a constant multiple of the wages
of low-skill workers and that the fraction of low-skill workers does not vary across
labor markets is fairly consistent with the data. The coefficient of variation of
restaurant worker wages within a city varies very little with the average wage within
a city, according to our calculations using CPS data. This is consistent with our
joint hypothesis.
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G. Total Employment Effects
Finally, we are not only interested in low-skill employment but total
employment as well. To calculate the impact on total restaurant industry
employment, denoted E, we must compute a weighted average of the low-
and high-skill workers’ employment responses:
d ln E d ln L d ln H
p (Pr (L)) (1Pr (L)) #Pr (lowwage),( )d ln w d ln w d ln wmin min min
(21)
where is the share of workers who work for a minimum-Pr (lowwage)
wage restaurant,
Pr (lowwage)p
Pr (w ≥ w(L*))min , (22)
Pr (w ≥ w(L*)) (1Pr (w ≥ w(L*)))(Z /Z )min min min min
and is derived in equation (95) of Aaronson and French (2006).
III. Results
A. Parameters
Table 1 provides a summary of the parameters that we use to calibrate
the model. The right-hand column gives the baseline values that we use,
along with the range of values considered in the robustness checks to
follow. The appendix provides a full accounting of how we chose these
values.
B. Employment and Price Responses
Table 2 reports our estimates of the employment response to a 1%
minimum-wage hike under various scenarios for the key parameters. In
the top panel, the employment responses are based on a price response
( ) that is consistent with the aggregate results inE[d ln p/d ln w ]p 0.07min
Aaronson (2001) and Aaronson et al. (2005). The bottom panel is based
on a price response that is 1.5 standard errors below this estimate
( ).23 Within each panel, the demand elasticity,E[d ln p/d ln w ]p 0.05min
varies between 0.5 and 1.0, and the elasticity of substitution, betweenh, j,
0.5 and 0.8. The remaining parameters are set to our best assessment of
their value, as described in table 1 and the appendix. All reported em-
ployment responses are short run.24
23 These lower estimates are consistent with some specifications reported in
Aaronson (2001).
24 Predicted short-run price responses depend on how much the ratio variesh/j
from one. Given the range of estimates for h and j that we consider likely, the
difference between the long-run and short-run response is very small.
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Table 2
Estimates of under Different Assumptions about Labor Market Structure,l
Price Responses, the Elasticity of Demand for Food Away from Home ( ),h
and the Elasticity of Substitution between Labor and Capital ( )j
Parameter Assumptions
Employment
Response
When Extent of
Monopsony Power
Is Included
Competitive
Low-Skill
Employment
Response*
(1)
Extent of
Monopsony
Power
(V)†
(2)
Low
Skill
(3)
High
Skill
(4)
Total
(5)
Price response, :E[d ln p/d ln w ]p .07min
hp .5, jp .8 .36 .98 .34 .02 .23
hp 1.0, jp .8 .39 1.10 .45 .01 .32
hp .5, jp .5 .23 1.04 .25 .00 .18
hp 1.0, jp .5 .26 1.21 .36 .04 .26
Price response, :E[d ln p/d ln w ]p .05min
hp .5, jp .8 .36 .82 .25 .02 .17
hp 1.0, jp .8 .39 .90 .33 .01 .23
hp .5, jp .5 .23 .89 .19 .00 .13
hp 1.0, jp .5 .26 1.00 .26 .03 .19
Note.—See the text for details. See table 1 and the appendix for other parameter values used.
* .l #Pr(w 1w*)comp min
† See eq. (18). A number below one implies monopsony power.
The first column of table 2 displays the low-skill employment response
to a 1% minimum wage increase under the assumption that all firms are
price takers in the labor market, . Employment re-l #Pr (w 1 w*)comp min
sponses are described in equations (5) and (6) for firms where the minimum
wage binds. That is, labor markets are perfectly competitive, but some firms
pay above the minimum wage. First, consider the case where andhp 0.5
Under these conditions, a 1% increase in the minimum wage cutsjp 0.8.
the low-skill food away from home workforce by 0.36%. If thehp 1.0,
disemployment case is only slightly larger, approximately 0.39%. The es-
timates are a bit more sensitive to Whenj. jp 0.5, l #Pr (w 1comp min
falls to between 0.23 and 0.26. Reducing the elasticity of substitutionw*)
between factors eases the disemployment effect because firms have less
opportunity to substitute from labor to other factors. Accordingly, if j is
as high as one, the competitive employment response is over 0.5. While the
variety of values are noteworthy, given that the experiment covers what we
consider to be the range of plausible values for h and j (and other param-
eters), it appears to us that the employment response is not especially
sensitive to reasonable parameter choices. Therefore, we can place reason-
ably tight bounds on the low-skill employment response under fairly strict
assumptions about labor market structure.
Next, we introduce monopsony power in the labor market. Recall that
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increases in the minimum wage trace out the labor-supply curve (with
elasticity ) for monopsonists. Consequently, if all firms are monopso-g2
nists, minimum wage hikes significantly increase employment.25 Since
firms are adding workers in response to a minimum wage change, output
increases and prices fall. The model predicts that the price elasticity under
monopsony is roughly 0.07. By comparison, the price elasticity under
competition tends to be around 0.07.
Column 2 of table 2 reports the value of which is, as described inV,
equation (18), identified by the degree of actual pass-through relative to
the pure monopsony and perfect competition cases. A number substan-
tially below one would imply that monopsony power is important.26 For
example, if and , thenhp 0.5, jp 0.5, E[d ln p/d ln w ]p 0.07 Vpmin
suggesting that there is little monopsony power in the industry.1.04,
However, as factors become more substitutable, the elasticity of demand
becomes less elastic, or price responses are muted, the implied amount of
monopsony power increases. For example, if andjp 0.8, hp 0.5,
E[d ln p/d ln w ]p 0.05, Vp 0.82.min
Column 3 of table 2 reports our estimate of the low-skill employment
response to a 1% minimum-wage change when the extent of monopsony
power is accounted for explicitly. Calculations are based on equation (16).
Like our estimates developed in the perfect competition setting, these
employment responses tend to cluster, in this case in the 0.2 to 0.4
range, with the former appearing when j is low, h is low, and/or price
responses are high. A moderate reading of the parameters (jp 0.65,
and ) produces a V of 0.99 and a low-hp 0.75, E[d ln p/d ln w ]p 0.06min
skill employment response of 0.3.27
Of course, these estimates ignore the impact on high-skill employment
( ) and therefore potentially give a misleading pictureE[D ln H/D ln w ]min
of the total employment effect ( ). Column 4 of table 2E[D ln E/D ln w ]min
shows that the employment response for high-skill workers is always
negligible.
To estimate the impact on total restaurant industry employment, we
25 For example, when g p 0.5, l #Pr (w 1 w*)p 0.24.2 monop min
26 The value of V can exceed one if firms pass on more of a price increase than
would be expected given perfect competition. Empirically, overshifting of ad va-
lorem taxes has been found by, among others, Besley and Rosen (1999) in the
retail apparel industry and Karp and Perloff (1989) in the Japanese television
market.
27 The only other parameters that have a substantive impact on these magnitudes
are labor share ( ) and the share of workers that are low skill ( ). Tos  s Pr (L)L H
get an indication of the sensitivity of the results, we start with the baseline de-
scribed above (where and ). Alteringjp 0.65, hp 0.75, E[d ln p/d ln w ]p 0.06min
between 0.25 and 0.35 stretches the low-skill employment response to bes  sL H
between 0.36 and 0.27. If, instead, we allow to be between 0.6 and 0.8,Pr (L)
the low-skill employment response falls in the range of 0.37 to 0.26.
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must compute a weighted average of the low- and high-skill workers’
employment responses, as in equation (21). These results are presented
in column 5. The total employment response to a 1% increase in the
minimum wage is roughly 0.2, with estimates ranging between 0.1 to
0.3 under reasonable parameter choices.28
Not only do we compare our predicted aggregate price increases to
estimates in the literature, but we also compare predictions of price in-
creases in areas where the minimum wage does not bind with areas where
the minimum wage does bind. Consider the regression
D ln p
p gPr (w p w ) error , (23)i min i( )D ln wmin i
where is the average city-level price response and(D ln p/D ln w )min i
is the probability that an individual in city i is paid thePr (w p w )i min
minimum wage before the minimum wage hike. Assuming that all labor
markets are competitive implies that the regression coefficient g should
be from 0.15 to 0.22, depending on the specification.29 Furthermore, al-
lowing for the inferred amount of monopsony from table 2, the regression
coefficient g should be between 0.15 and 0.21.30
Using a panel of city level data, Aaronson et al. (2005) find that this
regression has a coefficient of 0.36 with a standard error of 0.24. Therefore,
estimated pass-through is greater than, but not statistically different from,
the predicted competitive response or the implied responses that allow
for some monopsony power as in table 2.
C. The Importance of Aggregation
How does accounting for heterogeneity affect our results? Table 3
shows estimates of the competitive and monopsony price responses, V,
and the competitive, monopsony, and expected total employment re-
sponses to a 1% change in the minimum wage under three scenarios.
Model 1 allows for labor market heterogeneity but not worker-type het-
erogeneity, model 2 for worker-type heterogeneity but not labor mar-
28 Furthermore, the other parameters, as discussed in the previous footnote,
have a negligible impact (always less than 0.03) on the total employment response.
29 Predicted values are obtained by setting in eq. (17 ), using the valueVp 1
of in eq. (20), and the formula for the relationship between ands Pr (w pw )L min i
derived in eq. (19). The range of values for g is obtained byPr (w ≥ w(L*))min
varying the parameters in the same way as was done in table 2.
30 To make this calculation, we assume that there are multiple labor markets
within each city. The minimum wage binds in some markets but not in others.
In all cities there is a probability V that firms in the market have monopsony
power if the minimum wage binds in that market. We then use the inferred value
of V from the model and use eqq. (17), (20), and (19).
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Table 3
Estimates of Price and Total Employment Responses under Different
Assumptions about Aggregation
Estimates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Price response ( )E[d ln p/d ln w ]min
under perfect competition .099 .051 .064
Price response ( )E[d ln p/d ln w ]min
under monopsony .109 .056 .071
The extent of monopsony power (V) .86 1.18 1.04
Total employment response:
Under perfect competition .17 .17 .17
Under monopsony .17 .17 .17
Weighted by V .12 .22 .18
Heterogeneity in skill type No Yes Yes
Heterogeneity in labor market type Yes No Yes
Note.—See text for detail. We use , and the parameter valueshp .5, jp .5 E[d lnp/d lnw ]p .07min
from table 2. Wagediff is set to 1.5 for models 2 and 3 and to match minimum-wage labor’s share of the
total wage bill and in model 1.Pr(w pw )min i
ket–type heterogeneity, and model 3 for heterogeneity in both labor mar-
ket and worker types. Specifically, model 1 assumes that some stores pay
all of their workers the minimum wage and the remainder pay none of
their workers the minimum wage. There is only one type of labor, but
variation in labor supply (i.e., v) causes the minimum wage to bind in
some markets and not others. Model 2 assumes that all restaurants within
a market are identical and that they all hire both high-skill and low-skill
labor. High-skill labor is always paid above the minimum wage, and low-
skill labor is always paid the minimum wage. Therefore, each firm hires
an identical share of the minimum-wage labor force and the above-min-
imum-wage labor force. Note that wage dispersion arises across stores in
model 1 but within stores in model 2. Model 3 is our preferred model,
where the amount of heterogeneity within and across firms is calibrated
using values in table 1. Model 3 was used to generate the predicted price
and employment responses in table 2.
Here it is clear that competitive and monopsony price responses (but
not employment responses) are sensitive to assumptions about labor mar-
ket and worker-type heterogeneity. The competitive price response varies
from 0.051 in model 2 to 0.099 in model 1. Relative to the empirical
evidence of a price response of 0.07, model 1 predicts larger price responses
than the evidence and model 2 smaller price responses than the evidence.
Consequently, model 1 predicts that some firms must have monopsony
power in order to reconcile a large predicted competitive response with
a relatively small measured response, but model 2 predicts that over 100%
of all firms are competitive. Therefore, relative to a competitive em-
ployment response of 0.17,31 model 1 predicts larger employment re-
31 The employment responses do not vary across models only when .jp h
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.139 on August 11, 2016 07:28:07 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage 189
sponses (in absolute magnitude) and model 2 predicts smaller employ-
ment responses.
When we allow for heterogeneity in both worker types and labor mar-
kets (model 3), we find that the predicted price response is very close to
the empirical estimates, and thus we infer that close to 100% of all firms
are competitive.32 As a result, the predicted total employment response
is also close to the competitive response. As we argue in the conclusion,
the estimates derived from model 3 are within the bounds set by the
empirical literature. However, ignoring heterogeneity within or across
establishments can badly bias price and employment responses.
To illustrate why aggregation affects the price response, and thus our
predicted value of V, consider the price response assuming all labor mar-
kets are competitive and (or alternatively, that all factors can adjust).jp h
Recall that competition implies that all labor costs are pushed onto con-
sumers in the form of higher prices. Inserting equation (4) into equation
(17) and assuming yieldsVp 1
d ln p
E p s #Pr (w ≥ w(L*)). (24)L min[ ]d ln wmin
Now consider what models 1 and 2 imply for , , ands Pr (w ≥ w(L*))L min
thus the predicted price responses. Setting , inserting equa-Z /Z p 1min min
tion (19) into (24) (and noting that there is only one type of labor in
model 1, so and , yieldsPr (L)p 1 s p s  s )L L H
d ln p
E p (s  s )#Pr (w p w ). (25)L H min i[ ]d ln wmin
Assuming model 2, where all firms are identical and pay some of their
workers the minimum wage—and thus andPr (L)p Pr (w p w )i min
—equations (24) and (20) can be rewritten asPr (w ≥ w(L*))p 1min
E[d ln p/d ln w ]pmin
(s  s )# (minimum-wage labor’s share of the total wage bill).L H
(26)
Using equations (25) and (26) and the values in table 3, we can better
understand the predicted price responses from models 1 and 2. Since
minimum-wage workers are paid less than other workers, (w p w ) 1min i
and thus price pass-′(minimum wage-labor s share of the total wage bill)
through is greater in the first model than the second. The difference arises
from the relative weight of high-wage and low-wage workers in the total
32 Table 2 shows that V ranges from just below one to just above one for
reasonable perturbations of the parameters.
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wage bill. For example, in the empirically relevant case where restaurant
size and labor’s share of the total wage bill are constant across restaurant
types, restaurants that hire minimum-wage workers have a smaller payroll
and fewer sales. Consequently, for a fixed payroll, this implies more “min-
imum-wage” restaurants in a labor market and a larger aggregate price
response to changes in minimum wage laws.
We now quantify the price predictions of models 1 and 2. Recall that
we estimate that roughly 33% of restaurant workers are affected by the
level of the minimum wage, although their compensation consists of only
17% of the aggregate restaurant wage bill. First consider model 1. If all
restaurants either pay the minimum wage or above the minimum wage,
33% of all workers are paid the minimum wage by the 33% of all res-
taurants that pay the minimum wage. This 33% of all restaurants has
pass-through of 30% (because labor’s share is 30%), and the rest have
pass-through of 0%, for an aggregate pass-through of 33% # 30% p
9.9%.
Next, consider model 2. If all restaurants have the same distributions
of high-wage and minimum-wage workers, then minimum-wage labor is
17% of labor costs at every restaurant. If total labor’s share is 30%, then
we should expect pass-through to be 30% # 17% p5.1% at every res-
taurant. The large differences between these two calculations makes it
clear that properly handling the aggregation issue is critical. Our best
assessment, model 3, lies between these two extremes.
IV. Conclusion
We use a model of labor demand to calibrate the employment response
to a change in the minimum wage for the food away from home industry.
If all firms are price takers in the labor market, the model predicts
roughly a 3.5% fall in low-skill employment in response to a 10%
increase in the minimum wage. A second implication of the competitive
model is that higher labor costs are pushed onto consumers in the form
of higher prices. This price response stands in sharp contrast to the
monopsony model, offering a way to identify the extent of monopsony
power in the labor market for the restaurant industry. Relying on pre-
vious research that shows that most of the higher labor costs incurred
by employers are pushed onto consumers in the form of higher prices,
we infer that few restaurants will have positive employment responses
in reaction to a minimum wage increase. Consequently, using the most
plausible range of estimates for the key parameters in the model, we
find that the low-skill employment response to a 10% change in the
minimum wage is likely to be around 3%. The total employment re-
sponse, including high-skill (non-minimum-wage) workers is likely to
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be around 2%. These estimates are just slightly below the perfect com-
petition prediction.
Are our findings consistent with studies that directly estimate the em-
ployment response to a minimum wage change? Again, we want to em-
phasize that the findings reported here are for the restaurant industry
only. As a result of different intensities of use of minimum-wage labor,
substitution possibilities, market structure, and demand for products,
other industries should face distinct employment responses. Conse-
quently, it is difficult to compare our results to those that identify the
employment effect of the comovement of teenage employment and the
minimum wage without knowing the full range of these parameters for
the major industry employers of teens.
However, if we were to compare our low-skill results to the teen studies,
we believe that our estimates would be well within the range supported
in the literature.33 Moreover, among those studies that explicitly look at
the restaurant industry, our results are quite consistent with Neumark
and Wascher (2000), who find the employment response to be around
0.2 but a bit larger than those reported in Card and Krueger (2000).34
An employment response of zero, while clearly theoretically plausible,
does not seem consistent with the level of monopsony power inferred
from the price responses observed in the food away from home sector.
Therefore, our results provide evidence against the hypothesis that mo-
nopsony power is important for understanding the observed small em-
ployment responses in the literature.
Appendix
The Parameters of the Model
This appendix details the parameter values we use in the calibration
exercise.
33 To get comparable estimates, the teen studies need to be adjusted for coverage
(see, e.g., table 2 in Brown [1999]). Brown’s adjustments are based on wage
distributions for 16–24-year-olds, as calculated in Neumark and Wascher (2002).
Brown argues that the share of workers in this age group affected by the minimum
wage is close to 20%, suggesting that the elasticity of demand for teenagers should
be factored up . However, since this calculation is based partly on 20–24-1/0.2p 5
year-olds, a more conservative guess for 16–19-year-olds would be 3.
34 Our results are not exactly comparable to theirs because our results are for
the entire restaurant industry, whereas their results are just for the fast food
industry, where a higher share of workers are paid the minimum wage.
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Price Pass-Through ( )E[d ln p/d ln w ]min
Aaronson et al. (2005) uses store-level data from the Food Away from
Home component of the CPI for the period 1995–97 to identify the extent
of price pass-through.35 They find that, in the aggregate, a 10% increase
in the minimum wage increases prices by roughly 0.7% during a 4-month
period around the minimum wage enactment date. These results are com-
parable to Aaronson (2001), which uses panels of U.S. city and Canadian
province CPI data from 1978 to 1995. Card and Krueger (1995) also use
CPI indexes for Food Away from Home in 27 large metropolitan areas,
finding larger price increases in those cities with higher proportions of
low-wage workers. Although their estimates are consistent with full pass-
through, their standard errors are extremely large. They cannot reject zero
price pass-through in many of their specifications. Moreover, additional
evidence from specific state increases in Texas and New Jersey suggests
close to no price response. As a result, Card and Krueger (1995, 148)
conclude that their estimates are “too imprecise to reach a more confident
assessment about the effects of the minimum wage on restaurant prices.”
However, Aaronson (2001) and Aaronson et al. (2005) use substantially
more data and document large and significant increases in food away from
home prices immediately surrounding an increase in the minimum wage.
These latter results are consistent with studies of price pass-through re-
sulting from other cost shocks, such as sales taxes levies (e.g., Besley and
Rosen 1999) and exchange rate movements (e.g., Yang 1997).
In the calibration exercise, which aggregates all markets and types of
restaurants, we use a value for of 0.05 or 0.07.E[d ln p/d ln w ]min
Labor’s Share ( )s  sL H
There are a number of sources for labor share, all of which tend to
report similar numbers for the food away from home industry. First, 10-
K company reports contain payroll to total expense ratios. Of the 17
restaurant companies that appear in a search of 1995 reports using the
SEC’s Edgar database, the unconditional mean and median of this measure
of labor share is 30%, and it ranges from 21% to 41%.36 These numbers
are in line with a sampling of 1995 corporate income tax forms from the
35 While the time frame is somewhat short, this 3-year period contains an un-
usual amount of minimum wage activity. A bill signed on August 20, 1996, raised
the federal minimum from $4.25 to $5.15 per hour, with the increase phased in
gradually. An initial increase to $4.75 (11.8%) occurred on October 1, and the
final installment (8.4%) took effect on September 1, 1997. Moreover, additional
variation can be exploited by taking advantage of cross-state differences in market
wages, state-imposed minimum wages that exceed federal levels, and differences
in establishment type.
36 The search uses five keywords: restaurant, steak, seafood, hamburger, and
chicken.
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Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics on Income Bulletin. Because operating
costs are broken down by category, it is possible to estimate labor’s share.37
According to these tax filings, labor cost as a share of operating costs for
eating place partnerships is roughly 33%. Consequently, we set s  sL H
to 30% but test the robustness of the results to values between 25% and
35%.
Finally, we are particularly interested in labor share in low-wage firms.
Depending on the elasticity of substitution between factors, firms in high-
wage labor markets theoretically could have either a higher or lower
labor’s share. To gauge this heterogeneity, we use the 1997 Economic
Census for Accommodations and Food Services, which reports payroll
for full-service (FS) and limited-service (LS) restaurants. Since LS include
fast-food stores and any restaurant without sit-down service and where
customers pay at the counter prior to receiving their meals, they tend to
be the primary employer of minimum-wage labor. According to this 1997
census, labor share, as a fraction of sales, is slightly higher at FS (31%)
than LS (25%) stores.38 Therefore, there is little evidence of a significant
difference in labor share across establishment type.
Furthermore, there is no evidence of an association between labor share
and average city wages. Here, we correlate metropolitan statistical area
(MSA)–level labor share from the 1997 Economic Census for Accom-
modations and Food Services with MSA-level real wage rates computed
from the 1990-99 outgoing rotation files of the Current Population Survey
(CPS). That correlation is small and statistically insignificant for both
limited-service (0.08) and full-service (0.06) establishments. The lack
of a geographic association between labor share and wages is particularly
evident when breaking the cities into quartiles based on their average
wage rate during the 1990s. For limited-service establishments, labor share
is (lowest to highest wage quartile) 0.258, 0.262, 0.260, and 0.256. Among
full-service establishments, labor share is 0.308, 0.312, 0.311, and 0.306.
See the appendix of Aaronson and French (2006) for further discussion
of this point.
Capital and Material’s Share ( and )s sK M
Based on the same sample of company financial reports used to compute
, we assume that capital share is 30% and materials share is 40%.s  sL H
When we allow to vary, we also allow either capital or materials  sL H
37 The IRS claims that labor cost is notoriously difficult to decompose for
corporations, and therefore we restrict our analysis to partnerships, where there
is less concern about reporting.
38 Several 10-K reports of individual restaurant companies show that wages
account for 85% of compensation. Therefore, labor’s share based on compensation
is roughly 36%–29% at full- and limited-service restaurants.
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share to adjust accordingly. The results are not sensitive to modifications
of these shares between capital and materials.
The Share of Minimum-Wage Workers ( ) andPr (w p w )min i
Minimum-Wage Labor’s Share of the Total Wage Bill
The minimum wage should affect prices and employment only if it
affects wages. Therefore, we need the share of workers’ wages influenced
by the minimum wage policy. Since this is not available in company
reports, we estimate the share of employees who are paid at or very near
the minimum wage from the outgoing rotation files of the CPS for the
2 years prior to the 1996 legislation.39 During this time period, 23% of
restaurant industry workers were within 10% of the minimum wage and
therefore were clearly affected by a characteristically sized 10% increase
in the minimum wage.
However, this estimate is insufficient for understanding the fraction of
workers affected by the minimum wage change. Workers paid slightly
above the minimum wage also tend to receive pay increases in response
to minimum wage increases.40 To approximate this phenomena, we use
the outgoing rotation file wage distribution and assume that one-third of
workers within 150% of the old minimum are affected by the new min-
imum wage change. No one beyond this threshold is assumed to be
affected. These assumptions imply That is, one-Pr (w p w )p 0.33.min i
third of restaurant workers are influenced by minimum wage legislation.
We test the robustness of the results to values of betweenPr (w p w )min i
0.25 and 0.40.
Using the same CPS data and assumptions about spillovers, we also
estimate that minimum wage labor constitutes 17% of the wage bill.
Therefore, 33% of all restaurant workers are paid the minimum wage,
but they are paid only 17% of the total value of wage payments in the
restaurant industry.
The Wage Distribution Parameters ( and wagediff)Pr (L)
We allow for wage heterogeneity in two dimensions. We assume that
there are two types of workers (high skill and low skill) and two types
of labor markets (high wage and low wage). We assume that low-skill
workers in high-wage markets are always paid above the minimum wage
(as are all high-skill workers). However, all low-skill workers in low-
39 There are no federal changes and only two state changes during these 2 years.
We exclude the two states Vermont and Washington with such activity, as well
as all data from June to August of 1995, for which there are no geographic
identifiers.
40 See Grossman (1983) and Card and Krueger (1995) for empirical evidence
and Card and Krueger (1995), Teulings (2000), and Manning (2003) for potential
explanations.
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wage labor markets are paid the minimum wage. Furthermore, we assume
that all restaurants have the same skill distribution, so the probability of
being low skill, does not vary by labor market. Given this as-Pr (L),
sumption, equals the probability that someone in a low-wage laborPr (L)
market is paid the minimum wage. This pins down the probability that
a worker is low skill.
We define a local labor market as a city. Aaronson et al. (2005) uses
the 1979–95 CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups to estimate the share of
restaurant workers that are paid at or near the minimum wage among
cities covered in the CPI survey.41 That paper finds that roughly 70% of
restaurant workers are paid at or near the minimum wage in the lowest-
wage cities. Therefore, we assume but allow to varyPr (L)p 0.70 Pr (L)
between 0.60 and 0.80.
In order to allow for wage differences across labor markets, we set v
as a two-point distribution. The distribution for v shifts wages for both
high-skill and low-skill workers, which, in turn, shifts wagediff. We pick
to match the dispersion in wages across cities. Althoughwagediffp 1.5
the ratio of average wages in high-wage cities (i.e., the highest-paying
50% of cities represented in the CPI) to average wages in low-wage cities
is roughly 1.15, different measures of dispersion give larger differences in
high-wage versus low-wage areas. For example, the ratio of wages in the
top 15% of all cities relative to the bottom 15% of all cities is 1.5.
Using this information, we can infer the probability that an individual
restaurant pays the minimum wage to its low-skill workers using equation
(19). Furthermore, we can infer the share of all restaurant workers who
work for restaurants that pay the minimum wage using equation (22).
Average Restaurant Size in High-Wage versus Low-Wage Labor
Markets ( )Z /Zmin min
We compute the average number of employees per restaurant in high-
wage ( ) and low-wage ( ) markets using the 1997 Economic Cen-Z Zmin min
sus for Accommodations and Food Services. Our definition of a labor
market is an MSA. High and low wage cities are determined by the 1990-
1999 average real wage computed from the Outgoing Rotation Files of
the CPS. We combine limited-service and full-service establishments to
41 The 27 CPI cities are New York City, Philadelphia, Boston, Pittsburgh, Buf-
falo, Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, Cleveland, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Milwaukee,
Cincinnati, Kansas City, District of Columbia, Dallas, Baltimore, Houston, At-
lanta, Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, San Diego, Portland, Honolulu,
Anchorage, and Denver. After 1986, prices for 12 of these cities—Buffalo, Min-
neapolis-St. Paul, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Atlanta, San Diego, and
Seattle, Portland, Honolulu, Anchorage, and Denver—are reported semiannually.
Therefore, they only included pre-1986 observations for those cities.
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compute restaurant size from all restaurants. The results are similar if we
look at all eating and drinking places.
We find that restaurants in high-wage cities employ roughly 10% fewer
workers than in low-wage cities. For example, the ratio of restaurant size
in the 15% of cities with the highest wages relative to 15% of cities with
the lowest wages is 0.9.
Admittedly, there is a great deal of restaurant size heterogeneity within
a city. Furthermore, much of this heterogeneity could be because local
labor markets are smaller than cities. In order to explore the importance
of restaurant size within a city, we measure average restaurant size for
full-service (which rarely pay the minimum wage) and limited-service
(which often pay the minimum wage) restaurants separately.
We find, on average, that limited-service restaurants employ a little over
20% fewer workers than full-service restaurants across all cities, 10%
fewer among low-wage cities, and 30% fewer among high-wage cities.
Therefore, using restaurant type, is, on average, 1.2, but it variesZ /Zmin min
from 1.1 to 1.3.
Given the range of estimates for , we set it at one as ourZ /Zmin min
benchmark, but we allow it to vary between 0.9 and 1.3.
The Elasticity of Demand for Food Away from Home (h)
There is little compelling evidence on h for the restaurant industry.
Brown (1990) uses 1977 and 1982 cross-sectional Census data to calculate
an h of 0.2 and 1 for food away from home and fast food, respectively.
Piggott’s (2003) estimates, which use time series data and a generalized
model of food demand that nests the main demand systems currently in
use, suggest more elastic demand, probably above 1. Hussain (2004) uses
repeated cross-sectional data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and
carefully controls for some of the endogeneity problems associated with
demand estimation. Hussain finds an estimate of 0.2–0.3 in the basic
specification, although he obtains estimates of over one when he addresses
the endogeneity of labor supply and durables. In our results, we provide
estimates when h is between 0.5 and 1.0.
The Elasticity of Substitution between Labor and Capital (j)
We could not find estimates of j for restaurants. On the one hand, this
is unfortunate since there is little reason to expect that factor substitution
is equal across industries. In fact, Hamermesh’s (1993) review of industry-
and product-specific j’s reveals a fairly broad range of estimates. However,
as Hamermesh stresses, micro-oriented estimates generally do not alter
conclusions reached from studies using aggregated data. Substitution be-
tween labor and capital is generally between 0.5 and 1.0 for the vast
majority of industries, with a mean estimate of 0.75 from Hamermesh’s
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review of aggregate studies and 0.50 from his review of micro studies.
Given that the overwhelming majority of these studies are based on man-
ufacturing sectors, the closest parallel to the eating and drinking industry
that we could find was Goodwin and Brester (1995), which analyzes the
food manufacturing industry and which finds that j was roughly 0.9 in
the 1970s and 0.5 thereafter.42 Therefore, we allow j to vary between 0.5
and 0.8.
The Marshallian Labor Supply Elasticities ( and )g g1 2
We set the labor supply elasticity, holding wages at other firms fixed,
at , but we examined the robustness of the results to values betweeng p 51
2 and 10. This range is based on Card and Krueger’s (1995, 376) inter-
pretation of calibrated from estimates of wage elasticities of the hiringg1
and quit functions. Card and Krueger conclude that while could varyg1
between 2 and 10, the upper range is more theoretically and empirically
plausible.
We set , an approximation that is exact if v has a uniform1/g(v)p 1/2g1
density. However, we found all values of to give very1/g(v)  (0, 1/g )1
similar results.
Bhaskar and To (1999) and Manning (2003) point out that if the labor
market is characterized by monopsonistic competition rather than pure
monopsony, then setting calibrated using hire and quit rates willg p g1 2
lead to erroneous inference. Under monopsonistic competition, increases
in a firm’s wage reduce the quantity of labor supplied at all other firms.
Because an increase in a binding minimum wage increases the wage of all
firms, it will have a smaller effect on a firm’s labor supply than just
increasing that firm’s wage. Although, for most demographic groups,
labor supply elasticities are close to zero, the empirical evidence is that
labor supply is somewhat elastic for low-wage groups. Therefore, we set
but allow it to vary between zero and one.g p 0.52
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